Scepticism and Philosophical Problems of Perception - Einzelansicht

Funktionen:

Veranstaltungsart	Seminar	Veranstaltungsnummer
SWS	2	Semester	SoSe 2018
Einrichtung	Institut für Philosophie	Sprache	englisch
Weitere Links	comment
Belegungsfristen	03.04.2018 - 20.05.2018 Belegung über PULS
Belegungsfristen	03.04.2018 - 10.05.2018 Belegung über PULS

Gruppe 1:

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		Tag	Zeit	Rhythmus	Dauer	Raum	Lehrperson	Ausfall-/Ausweichtermine	Max. Teilnehmer/-innen
	Seminar	Mi	14:00 bis 16:00	wöchentlich	11.04.2018 bis 18.07.2018	1.11.1.25	Prof. Dr. Haag
Einzeltermine: 11.04.2018 18.04.2018 25.04.2018 02.05.2018 09.05.2018 16.05.2018 23.05.2018 30.05.2018 06.06.2018 13.06.2018 20.06.2018 27.06.2018 04.07.2018 11.07.2018 18.07.2018

Kommentar	Please follow the "comment" link above for more information on comments, course readings, course requirements and grading. Vorbemerkung: Die Veranstaltung wird von Mahdi Ranaee in englischer Sprache durchgeführt! In this course, I will inquire into the contemporary problems in the intersection of scepticism about the external world and epistemology of perception. The course will have three major parts. In the first part, I will begin by considering different kinds of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian, Humean and Cartesian scepticism, and then briefly discussing their differences and relations. After that, I will continue by mentioning different formalizations of scepticism about the external world (hereafter I use ‘scepticism’ to refer only to this kind of scepticism), such as the one based on Closure Principle and the one based on underdetermination of evidence. In the second part, after setting the stage for the discussion, the course will continued by describing and criticising different responses to the problem of scepticism. This part will include (i) Verificationist responses which hold that sceptical scenarios cannot be described in a meaningful manner, (ii) responses based on the rejection of the Principle of Closure, such as Dretske’s proposal, (iii) Externalist responses to the problem of scepticism such as Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s, (iv) Knowledge First responses, i.e. the Williamsonian position that our evidence is different in sceptical and normal scenario, (v) Disjunctivist responses, (vi) responses based on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), such as Johnathan Vogel’s, (vii) and finally Contextualist responses like Stewart Cohen’s response to scepticism. After that, in the third and last part, I will continue by some discussions about epistemological problems of perception which are related directly or indirectly to the problem of scepticism. This section of the course will include discussions about Dogmatism and Mooreanism about epistemological justification, in particular the debate between Crispin Wright and James Pryor, and the problem of Easy Knowledge.

Kommentar

Please follow the "comment" link above for more information on comments, course readings, course requirements and grading.

Vorbemerkung: Die Veranstaltung wird von Mahdi Ranaee in englischer Sprache durchgeführt!

In this course, I will inquire into the contemporary problems in the intersection of scepticism about the external world and epistemology of perception. The course will have three major parts. In the first part, I will begin by considering different kinds of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian, Humean and Cartesian scepticism, and then briefly discussing their differences and relations. After that, I will continue by mentioning different formalizations of scepticism about the external world (hereafter I use ‘scepticism’ to refer only to this kind of scepticism), such as the one based on Closure Principle and the one based on underdetermination of evidence. In the second part, after setting the stage for the discussion, the course will continued by describing and criticising different responses to the problem of scepticism. This part will include (i) Verificationist responses which hold that sceptical scenarios cannot be described in a meaningful manner, (ii) responses based on the rejection of the Principle of Closure, such as Dretske’s proposal, (iii) Externalist responses to the problem of scepticism such as Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s, (iv) Knowledge First responses, i.e. the Williamsonian position that our evidence is different in sceptical and normal scenario, (v) Disjunctivist responses, (vi) responses based on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), such as Johnathan Vogel’s, (vii) and finally Contextualist responses like Stewart Cohen’s response to scepticism. After that, in the third and last part, I will continue by some discussions about epistemological problems of perception which are related directly or indirectly to the problem of scepticism. This section of the course will include discussions about Dogmatism and Mooreanism about epistemological justification, in particular the debate between Crispin Wright and James Pryor, and the problem of Easy Knowledge.

Strukturbaum

Keine Einordnung ins Vorlesungsverzeichnis vorhanden. Veranstaltung ist aus dem Semester SoSe 2018 , Aktuelles Semester: SoSe 2024