Scepticism and Philosophical Problems of Perception - Single View

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Type of Course	Seminar	Number
Hours per week in term	2	Term	SoSe 2018
Department	Institut für Philosophie	Language	englisch
Additional Links	comment
application periods	03.04.2018 - 20.05.2018 enrollment
application periods	03.04.2018 - 10.05.2018 enrollment

Gruppe 1:

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		Day	Time	Frequency	Duration	Room	Lecturer	Canceled/rescheduled on	Max. participants
	Seminar	Mi	14:00 to 16:00	wöchentlich	11.04.2018 to 18.07.2018	1.11.1.25	Prof. Dr. Haag

Description	Please follow the "comment" link above for more information on comments, course readings, course requirements and grading. Vorbemerkung: Die Veranstaltung wird von Mahdi Ranaee in englischer Sprache durchgeführt! In this course, I will inquire into the contemporary problems in the intersection of scepticism about the external world and epistemology of perception. The course will have three major parts. In the first part, I will begin by considering different kinds of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian, Humean and Cartesian scepticism, and then briefly discussing their differences and relations. After that, I will continue by mentioning different formalizations of scepticism about the external world (hereafter I use ‘scepticism’ to refer only to this kind of scepticism), such as the one based on Closure Principle and the one based on underdetermination of evidence. In the second part, after setting the stage for the discussion, the course will continued by describing and criticising different responses to the problem of scepticism. This part will include (i) Verificationist responses which hold that sceptical scenarios cannot be described in a meaningful manner, (ii) responses based on the rejection of the Principle of Closure, such as Dretske’s proposal, (iii) Externalist responses to the problem of scepticism such as Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s, (iv) Knowledge First responses, i.e. the Williamsonian position that our evidence is different in sceptical and normal scenario, (v) Disjunctivist responses, (vi) responses based on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), such as Johnathan Vogel’s, (vii) and finally Contextualist responses like Stewart Cohen’s response to scepticism. After that, in the third and last part, I will continue by some discussions about epistemological problems of perception which are related directly or indirectly to the problem of scepticism. This section of the course will include discussions about Dogmatism and Mooreanism about epistemological justification, in particular the debate between Crispin Wright and James Pryor, and the problem of Easy Knowledge.

Description

Please follow the "comment" link above for more information on comments, course readings, course requirements and grading.

Vorbemerkung: Die Veranstaltung wird von Mahdi Ranaee in englischer Sprache durchgeführt!

In this course, I will inquire into the contemporary problems in the intersection of scepticism about the external world and epistemology of perception. The course will have three major parts. In the first part, I will begin by considering different kinds of scepticism, such as Pyrrhonian, Humean and Cartesian scepticism, and then briefly discussing their differences and relations. After that, I will continue by mentioning different formalizations of scepticism about the external world (hereafter I use ‘scepticism’ to refer only to this kind of scepticism), such as the one based on Closure Principle and the one based on underdetermination of evidence. In the second part, after setting the stage for the discussion, the course will continued by describing and criticising different responses to the problem of scepticism. This part will include (i) Verificationist responses which hold that sceptical scenarios cannot be described in a meaningful manner, (ii) responses based on the rejection of the Principle of Closure, such as Dretske’s proposal, (iii) Externalist responses to the problem of scepticism such as Hilary Putnam’s and Donald Davidson’s, (iv) Knowledge First responses, i.e. the Williamsonian position that our evidence is different in sceptical and normal scenario, (v) Disjunctivist responses, (vi) responses based on Inference to the Best Explanation (IBE), such as Johnathan Vogel’s, (vii) and finally Contextualist responses like Stewart Cohen’s response to scepticism. After that, in the third and last part, I will continue by some discussions about epistemological problems of perception which are related directly or indirectly to the problem of scepticism. This section of the course will include discussions about Dogmatism and Mooreanism about epistemological justification, in particular the debate between Crispin Wright and James Pryor, and the problem of Easy Knowledge.

Structure Tree

Lecture not found in this Term. Lecture is in Term SoSe 2018 , Currentterm: SoSe 2024