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We don’t call it War - Unsuccessful Bundeswehr Approaches in Afghanistan - Einzelansicht

Veranstaltungsart Übung Veranstaltungsnummer
SWS 2 Semester SoSe 2020
Einrichtung Historisches Institut   Sprache englisch
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Belegungsfrist 20.04.2020 - 10.05.2020

Belegung über PULS
Gruppe 1:
     jetzt belegen / abmelden
    Tag Zeit Rhythmus Dauer Raum Lehrperson fällt aus am Max. Teilnehmer/-innen
Einzeltermine anzeigen
Übung Do 16:00 bis 18:00 wöchentlich 23.04.2020 bis 23.07.2020 Dr. phil. Kriemann  

Please follow the "comment" link above for more information on comments, course readings, course requirements and grading.
Dear all,

we're all going through difficult times right now. The pandemic poses many different challenges. The chair an we as lecturers will do everything to ensure that you can continue your studies in the summer semester 2020. The exercise on the Bundeswehr in Afghanistan will definitely take place. Only the format will be different. This means that you do not have to be present on site. I will provide the curriculum and reading via moodle. There we can also upload videos. Each of you will be required to give a video presentation of 10 to 15 minutes and also some short comments about the presentation of your fellow students (max. 1 page).

I look forward to seeing you and stay healthy!

Dr. Hans-Peter Kriemann, Lieutenant Colonel 

This course will explain how the German armed forces have failed to stabilize Afghanistan. Several approaches have been implemented by the Bundeswehr since 2001, depending on a set of aims that has been adapted several times, but success has been elusive. This course will identify these approaches and give reasons for their lack of success.

  • Chiari, Bernhard, A New Model Army: The Bundeswehr in Kunduz, 2003-2012. In: From Venus to Mars? Provincial Reconstruction Teams and the European Military Experience in Afghanistan, 2001-2014. On behalf of the Bundeswehr Centre of Military History and Social Siences ed. by Bernhard Chiari, Freiburg i.Br./Berlin/Wien 2014, p. 135-156. 
  • Crawford, Neta (2018): Human Cost of the Post-9/11 Wars: Lethality and the Need for Transparency, https://watson.brown.edu/costsofwar/costs/human
  • Glatz, Rainer, ISAF Lessons Learned. A German Perspective. In: Prism 2, No. 2, p. 169-176 http://www.operationspaix.net/DATA/DOCUMENT/4253~v~ISAF_Lessons_Learned__A_German_Perspective.pdf
  • Harsch, Michael F., A Reluctant Warrior. The German Engagement in Afghanistan, Prio Paper, Oslo 2011 https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=381&type=publicationfile
  • Münch, Phillipp, The German Approach to Counterinsurgency: Concepts and Practice. In: Afghanistan in the Balance: Counterinsurgency, Comprehensive Approach, and Political Order ed. by Hans-Georg Ehrhart, Sven Bernhard Gareis and Charles Pentland,  Kingston (ON) Canada 2012, pp. 51-67
  • Noetzel, Timo, Germany. In: Understanding Counterinsurgency. Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges. Ed. by Thomas Rid and Thomas Keaney, London [et.al.] 2010, p. 46-58.
  • Schroeder, Robin and Martin Zapfe, "War like Circumstances": Germany's Unforeseen Combat Mission in Afghanistan and Its Strategic Narratives. In: Strategic Narratives, Public Opinion and War: Winning Domestic Support for the Afghan War ed. by George Dimitriu, Beatrice de Graaf, and Jens Ringsmose, Abingdon 2015, p. 177-198
Leistungsnachweis Präsentation im Kurs und Seminararbeit.

Keine Einordnung ins Vorlesungsverzeichnis vorhanden. Veranstaltung ist aus dem Semester SoSe 2020 , Aktuelles Semester: SoSe 2023