Epistemic Injustice and Recognition - Einzelansicht

Is it unjust if a man enjoys more credibility than a woman? A white person more than a black person? And what happens, if we fail to understand our own experiences and moral injuries due to a lack of concepts? Miranda Fricker’s theories of epistemic injustice have closed a theoretical gap both in epistemology and moral theory and are now used widely in political theory, social philosophy, moral theory, and applied ethics. Epistemic injustices concern the (systematic) injustice that pertain to the dimension of knowledge; they are what happens to a person as a knowing subject.

In this seminar, we will discuss Fricker’s theories and other contributions to the topic and relate these to contemporary theories of recognition. We will read papers by José Medina, Matthew Congdon, Debra L. Jackson, and others. The seminar is in English.

Background literature:

Fricker, M. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power & the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Kidd, I., Medina, J. and Pohlhaus, G. (eds.) 2017. The Routledge Handbook of Epistemic Injustice. Abingdon: Routledge.

Giladi, P. and McMillan, N. (eds.) 2018. Special Issue: Epistemic Injustice and Recognition Theory, Feminist Philosophy Quarterly 4(4).